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Introduction 
Dear Editor: 
Dr. Al-Saadi is a rare breed among contemporary Iraqi economists in advocating a national vision 
for Iraq. There is a plethora of writings about Iraq’s economy but hardly any one touch the 
formulation of a vision. Most of them are concerned with the country’s oil industry and the 
prospects for increasing the level of production and devising a role for the involvement of foreign 
oil companies and private investment.[1] 
His latest contribution, “Iraq’s National Vision, Economic Strategy and Policies,” (Strategic 
Insights V, March 2006) continues and sums up previous studies published in many journals in 
Arabic and English including MEES (Middle East Economic Survey) and elsewhere. 
Dr. Al-Saadi is rightly concerned with the urgent need for formulating what he calls a ‘national 
vision’ and macro-economic policies, both of which are missing in public discourse in Iraq. 
Though not stated, qualifying the vision as “national” is meant to be or presumes a vision that 
have the consensus of the majority of those concerned with formulating Iraq’s economic policies. 
Such policies impact various vested interests inside and outside Iraq and are therefore an area of 
contention: what model of development to adopt, and what role to assign to the state and the 
public sector, or what remains of it, vis-à-vis the private sector and what role should be performed 
by foreign capital and a host of other questions. 
One feels that the nature of the publication does not allow the writer to work out the ramifications 
of policies and the role assigned to various economic entities: private/public companies, 
ministries directly concerned with the economy, the role of state and the central bank as agent of 
economic development, etc. Nor did he have space to point to some of the consequences of 
policy prescriptions. However, the message is there: tinkering with the economy and demagogic 
sloganeering fundamental economic issues (for example, “oil wealth for the people”) is not a 
recipe for sustainable economic development. 
Because of the density of his writing, it would be most useful if the writer sets out his thoughts in 
the form of a textbook, in Arabic, to cater for a larger community of readers as much as the 
majority of the ill-informed Iraqi politicians on matters to do with the economy.[2] Many of them, 
while in opposition mainly in the West, were “businessmen” of one sort or another, i.e., they had 
some exposure or engaged in retail activity or contracting but that hardly qualifies them to engage 
in managing the economy, let alone designing economic policies. Hence their present obsession 
with political power while they are barricading themselves in the Green Zone. 
Moreover, they have apparently surrendered budgeting and policy-making to the occupying 
power (the ground was laid by the U.S. proconsul Paul Bremer’s 100 or so ideologically motivated 
orders (Laws) in 2003-2004) and the army of consultants operating by remote control from Jordan, 
Cyprus, Kuwait, and elsewhere, regurgitating prescriptions taken from textbooks or blindly 
recommending policies applied in other countries or appealing to the re-structuring model of the 
IMF. 
Indeed, the 2006 state budget, instead of being a vehicle for development, has been designed as 
an end in itself with heavy concentration on immediate needs, the provision of which are made to 
be consistent with international financial institutions. For example, raising the price of oil products 
in return for meagre measures in the area of social security; disregarding the spiral effect of such 
an increase on the cost and price of other goods and services; reducing rations in kind (the 
budget figures reduced the ration allocation from U.S. $4 billion to $3 billion, and this at a time 
when oil revenues in 2005 has increased compared with 2004 figures and the increase in the 
dollar reserves held by the Central Bank of Iraq). 
Politics, with little economic content, has been and is the supreme and prime activity of these 
politicians and the economy is left to remote controllers (or their disciples in Iraq) and to reliance 
on oil revenues to finance state expenditure and to cover up budget deficits. That much they 
know about the significance of oil (Dr. Al-Saadi’s vision must look incomprehensible to them, 
since it was not part of their training nor was it advocated by a foreign consultant to have a 
significant value). They do not, of course, tire from repeating the privatisation mantra as a 
panacea for all the economic problems of Iraq and calling for foreign direct investment as though 
capitalists will rush to invest in volatile, corrupt economies and politically unstable terrorist-ridden 
countries (the corruption-infested activities of mainly U.S. and British contractors, in the wake of 
Iraq’s occupation, do not augur well for economically sound investments in Iraq).[3] In any case, 
these activities did not contribute to re-generating the Iraqi economy. 
There are leaks, misuse, and abuse of Iraqi funds from Saddam’s era through the Iraq 
Development Fund and Bremer’s policies right up to the present. Since March 2003 these can be 
summed up under the following headings: corruption in its various forms including fraud,[4] 
expenditure on training (capacity building) abroad possibly at artificially high cost,[5] security 
protection (according to an IMF August 2005 report[6] all projects in Iraq eat up to 50% of the 
total cost), foreign consultants and advisers. Expenditure in these areas does not contribute to 
economic activity inside Iraq nor does it enhance effective aggregate demand à la Keynes for 
domestic industry. This to say nothing about the far more significant crude oil leaks (not only in 
the literal sense but also in the form of unaccounted flow attributed to lack of calibration 
equipment at loading terminals and smuggling). 
The picture would not be complete without mentioning the disastrous policies of the U.S. pro-
consul Paul Bremer in “smashing” the Iraqi state (in the crude Marxist fashion), instituting his own 
“dictatorship” (in the Roman dictatura sense)[7] and the unaccountable squandering of valuable 
funds (like a profligate but with a difference, as the funds were not his) that could and should 
have been properly spent on infrastructural works instead of painting schools using inflated 
indefinite duration/indefinite quantity contingency forms of contracts. This is to say nothing of the 
ill-thought enterprise of invading Iraq and inviting the Bin Laden-ites to Iraq as the U.S. battlefield 
for the war against international terrorism. The political and economic consequences of the 
invasion are now the dominant reality stifling real progress in Iraq. 
Dr. Al-Saadi’s paper is premised on the existence/creation of a free market. The obverse of that 
premise, which is not stated, is a conviction in maintaining a significant role for the state—not 
necessarily along the South Korean model (1960 to the mid-1990s), i.e., strong state involvement 
in what used to be called during the Soviet era “the commanding heights of the economy.” This 
conviction is based on a perception (as I do not have facts and figures) that Iraq’s “capitalist 
class” (the private sector) is weak not only numerically, but also in terms of the capital resources 
at its disposal. It has been historically weakened with the haphazard nationalisation of 1964. 
(Shopkeepers and intermediaries of various kinds are no substitute to industrial entrepreneurs 
nor is the currently fashionable microfinance sufficient for the large-scale development of the 
economy). The private sector itself needs “rehabilitation,” through properly thought of measures, 
to be able to engage in implementing part of the programme envisaged under Dr. Al-Saadi’s Iraqi 
Development and Reconstruction Council (IDRC).[8] 
The classic model of economic development, or should one say, growth, was hinged on the 
increase in the rate of capital accumulation and accumulation itself being determined by the rate 
of national saving. This assumes that saving leads to investment (expanding production capacity, 
introducing new technology and new products, penetrating and searching for new markets) and 
that with the increase in the rate of saving the production function is maximised leading to a 
higher growth rate. Protectionist economists would have favoured domestic saving as the fulcrum 
for the sought after accumulation. Increasingly, this was to be complemented by a flow of foreign 
“savings” in the form of loans, portfolio investment, banking deposits, and direct investment. 
Al-Saadi’s model is of course far removed form this classical framework since there is no mention 
of saving as an instrument of capital accumulation, or exclusive reliance on foreign loans. His 
national vision entails utilisation of endogenous resources (the private sector and oil revenue with 
capacity building of the labour force and market institutions, i.e. the model takes care of the basic 
functions underlying most growth models: the production function, the saving function, and labour 
supply function (related to population growth, although he does not dwell on this except in the 
context of capacity building and it is therefore assumed away). 
His model has the virtue of focusing on two essentially inter-related elements: how to set 
economic growth in motion, after years of neglect and devastation, in the short- and medium-
terms, and sustain it in the long term. If my understanding is correct, he is calling for the “creation” 
of a liberalised market free from state imposed barriers and an interventionist (proactive) role for 
the state, albeit in the form of the independently run IDRC, which is meant to kick-start the growth 
process and help develop domestic entrepreneurship. Oil revenues remain crucial for the 
implementation of the model, but these revenues, unless they are carefully managed, mortgage 
the sought-after IDRC to “foreign” influences (i.e. volatile oil prices and submission to 
international financial institutions, on which Iraq has limited (via OPEC) or no control). One feels 
that without a vision, as advocated by Dr. Al-Saadi, Iraq will continue to be a “rentier state” 
underpinned by revenues derived from oil production. 
In concluding his study, Dr. Al-Saadi stated that Iraq has the “required human and natural 
resources to become a successful, democratic, and free market economic model in the Middle 
East.” [Emphasis added]. This is an optimistic vision, although this projection is based on the 
government and mainstream political parties adopting a well-defined strategy and policies for the 
short-, medium- and long-terms. Based on what is happening now, this is a well-intentioned 
dream-like vision. It is a forlorn hope as his own analysis of the National Development Strategy 
(NDS) shows that the pace of progress is sluggish, and this in itself is a pointer to what lies in the 
future. 
Furthermore, the increasing dependence on foreign loans and grants, as he has pointed out, 
would deepen the structural economic problems and contribute to embedding corruption as an 
acceptable lever of economic activity.[9] 
One can argue, based on a few random rhetorical questions, that the Iraqi economy is still 
stagnant: 
· How many employment opportunities have been created since the invasion of Iraq?  
· Has the level of real and disguised unemployment been reduced (variously estimated 
between 30%-5o%)?  
· How many public sector companies have been rehabilitated to become operational or 
made ready for privatisation? (Free trade and imports, instituted by Bremer, have 
resulted in lifting any kind of protection to Iraq’s public and private industry and 
agriculture.)  
· Has the rate of national saving increased?  
· Has the volume of domestic investable income increased?  
· Why have the “international community’s” grants been reduced to a trickle if not stopped?  
· When will politicians take leave from their ethnicity and think of Iraq as a whole? (We 
read statements of Kurdish politicians justifying exploration and production oil deals on 
constitutional grounds, and asserting that this wealth will be used for the benefit of the 
people in the region. So much goes for the concept of a “national economy” in the 
evolving ethnically-based regional economics, especially since we also hear of some 
governorates in the south threatening to disrupt oil supplies unless this or that economic 
or political good is delivered.  
· And without sounding as though I am a believer in a conspiracy theory of politics, there is 
a serious question that needs an answer: who is killing Iraqis and why? Who is killing 
academics in large numbers? How many years does it takes to produce an academic 
with minimum critical faculties in his/her discipline? (Evidently this has to be assessed as 
part of the overall brain drain from which the Iraqi economy has been suffering for many 
years).  
These and other issues hardly point to Iraq becoming a model for the Middle East. It appears that 
the worst features of tribalism, warlordism, sectarianism, and other forms of backwardness are 
consolidating their presence in public life—and these will find their translation in the running of the 
economy. 
Misbah Kamal  
London 
April 3, 2006 
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